jueves, 15 de marzo de 2012

Documentos de la Doctrina

Existen varios documentos sobre la Doctrina, entre ellos nos encontramos con el discurso oficial de John Foster Dulles, del cual presentamos un extracto e invitamos al lector a que visiten el sitio del que fue extraído:
The Strategy of Massive Retaliation
Speech of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the Council on Foreign Relations
January 12, 1954
It is now nearly a year since the Eisenhower administration took office. During that year I have often spoken of various parts of our foreign policies. Tonight I should like to present an overall view of those policies which relate to our security.
First of all, let us recognize that many of the preceding foreign policies were good. Aid to Greece and Turkey had checked the Communist drive to the Mediterranean. The European Recovery Program [Marshall Plan] had helped the peoples of Western Europe to pull out of the postwar morass. The Western powers were steadfast in Berlin and overcame the blockade with their airlift. As a loyal member of the United Nations, we had reacted with force to repel the Communist attack in Korea. When that effort exposed our military weakness, we rebuilt rapidly our military establishment. We also sought a quick build up of armed strength in Western Europe.

These were the acts of a nation which saw the danger of Soviet communism; which realized that its own safety was tied up with that of others; which was capable of responding boldly and promptly to emergencies. These are precious values to be acclaimed. Also, we can pay tribute to congressional bipartisanship which puts the nation above politics.

But we need to recall that what we did was in the main emergency action, imposed on us by our enemies…. We live in a world where emergencies are always possible, and our survival may depend upon our capacity to meet emergencies. Let us pray that we shall always have that capacity. But, having said that, it is necessary also to say that emergency measures - however good for the emergency - do not necessarily make good permanent policies. Emergency measures are costly; they are superficial; and they imply that the enemy has the initiative. They cannot be depended on to serve our long-time interests.

El archivo fue recuperado el 8 de marzo del 2012 y e aquí la liga del sitio web: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1556858/posts

Otro texto que muestra el discurso de Dulles, pero presentado contextualmente, se encuentra en History Channel, en un apartado de su sitio oficial llamado “This Day in History”. El texto contiene una parte que resulta de suma importancia pues indica que la declaración mostraba la de decisión del gobierno de Eisenhower de confiar firmemente en el arsenal nuclear de los Estados Unidos como el primer medio de defensa contra una agresión comunista.
He aquí el texto y la liga del sitio donde se encuentra hospedado:

Jan 12, 1954:
Dulles announces policy of massive retaliation

In a speech at a Council on Foreign Relations dinner in his honor, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announces that the United States will protect its allies through the "deterrent of massive retaliatory power." The policy announcement was further evidence of the Eisenhower administration's decision to rely heavily on the nation's nuclear arsenal as the primary means of defense against communist aggression.
Dulles began his speech by examining communist strategy that, he concluded, had as its goal the "bankruptcy" of the United States through overextension of its military power. Both strategically and economically, the secretary explained, it was unwise to "permanently commit U.S. land forces to Asia," to "support permanently other countries," or to "become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to 'practical bankruptcy.'" Instead, he believed a new policy of "getting maximum protection at a bearable cost" should be developed. Although Dulles did not directly refer to nuclear weapons, it was clear that the new policy he was describing would depend upon the "massive retaliatory power" of such weapons to respond to future communist acts of war.
The speech was a reflection of two of the main tenets of foreign policy under Eisenhower and Dulles. First was the belief, particularly on the part of Dulles, that America's foreign policy toward the communist threat had been timidly reactive during the preceding Democratic administration of President Harry S. Truman. Dulles consistently reiterated the need for a more proactive and vigorous approach to rolling back the communist sphere of influence. Second was President Eisenhower's belief that military and foreign assistance spending had to be controlled. Eisenhower was a fiscal conservative and believed that the U.S. economy and society could not long take the strain of overwhelming defense budgets. A stronger reliance on nuclear weapons as the backbone of America's defense answered both concerns--atomic weapons were far more effective in terms of threatening potential adversaries, and they were also, in the long run, much less expensive than the costs associated with a large standing army.

El archivo fue recuperado el 8 de marzo del 2012 del sitio web de History Channel:

¿Qué es la Doctrina Dulles?


La “Doctrina Dulles”, también conocida como “Doctrina Eisenhower” o como “Represalias Masivas”, fue una doctrina empleada por Estados Unidos en el seno de la Guerra Fría.
Eisenhower había llegado a la Casa Blanca en 1953 y, poco después, el Secretario de Estado, John Foster Dulles, dirigió una de las estrategias militares de mayor riesgo durante la Guerra Fría.
Técnicamente, la estrategia consistía en que, si la Unión Soviética atacaba, Estados Unidos no dudarían en lanzar una represalia masiva contra sus enemigos. En otras palabras, Estados Unidos tomaría represalias a base de su armamento nuclear.
Es prudente recordar que durante esta etapa de la Guerra Fría, Estados Unidos consideraba que su arsenal nuclear era mucho mayor que el de cualquier otra potencia en el mundo, por lo que confiaba en tal medio como su principal herramienta en la lucha contra el comunismo.
Básicamente la Doctrina se basa en estas tres premisas:

   En caso de un ataque soviético, los EE.UU. no dudarían en lanzar represalias masivas utilizando el arma nuclear.
   Respuesta inmediata que no tendría que darse necesariamente en lugar donde se hubiera producido la agresión.
   No existencia de "santuarios" libres de ataque. Cualquier lugar del bloque comunista, incluida la URSS, sería susceptible de ser atacado.
El contexto histórico en el que la Doctrina se desarrolló fue el inmediato a la Guerra de Corea, así como también las luchas independistas de la Indochina. Es entendible entonces que los Estados Unidos buscaran un remedio para que no ocurriera nuevamente lo que en Corea.
Aún con todo, la Doctrina era bastante extremista y se basaba en una amenaza sumamente difícil de cumplir. Eisenhower, como buen militar, comprendió eso mucho antes que Dulles y al final la amenaza que expresaba la Doctrina nunca se llevó a cabo.  


John F. Dulles